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ance pertaining to it. Accordingly, the
court rejected the State's argument
concerning the mother's statements and
similarly rejected application of the
present sense impression excep .! . . (0
the other three out-of-court statements
made to the victim's sister and to the
police officers.
The court of special appeals thus
rejected each ofthe state's theories on
admitting out-of-court statements made
by a victim about his killer to rebut the
battered spouse syndrome defense.
Moreover, the highly prejudicial nature of the statements contributed to
the court's conclusion. Overall, the
opinion may be helpful to defense attorneys who raise the defense of battered spouse syndrome, self-defense,
or hot-blooded provocation and must
prevent the state from admitting outof-court statements of the victims in
rebuttal to such defenses. Most importantly, however, the opinion clarified
the hearsay rules regarding verbal acts,
state of mind, and present sense impression, and thus, sought to prevent
their misuse by practioners and trial
judges in the future.
- Heather L. Ashbury

Morgan v. Illinois: TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INQUIRE WHETHER A POTENTIAL JUROR WOULD AUTOMA TICALL Y IMPOSE THE
DEATH PENALTY UPON CONVICTION WAS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct.
2222 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that during voir dire
in a capital offense case a defendant is
entitled to challenge for cause and have
removed a juror who would automatically impose the death penalty, irrespective of the facts of the case or the
trial court's instructions. In so holding, the Court proposed a due process
review standard which requires a trial
court to question venire panels about
their position on capital punishment.

In the state of Illinois, capital offense cases are tried in two phases. The
same jury may determine both a
defendant's guilt and the sentence, or
the defendant may elect to waive sentencing by the jury. Upon conviction
for a capital offense, a separate sentencing hearing is held to determine if
aggravating and mitigating factors existed. A unanimous jury must find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least
lout of 10 aggravating factors were
present in order to sentence the defendant to death. The defendant is given
the death penalty if the defendant is
eligible and the jury unanimously finds
no mitigating factors.
In 1990, Derrick Morgan was paid
$4,000 by an inner-city gang to kill a
narcotics dealer who was also his friend.
Morgan lured the victim into an abandoned apartment and shot him in the
head six times. After weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, an Illinois jury convicted the
petitioner of first degree murder and
sentenced him to death.
At trial in the Circuit Court for
Cook County, State prosecutors invoked their rights under Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in
which the United States Supreme Court
held that a state may excuse for cause
any venire members whose strong opposition to the death penalty would
render them unable to impose death
regardless ofthe circumstances. Consequently, the trial judge asked those
eventually empaneled whether any
would automatically vote against the
death penalty, irrespective ofthe facts.
The trial judge denied a similar request by the defense for a "reverseWitherspoon" inquiry, which would
have asked whether any juror would
automatically vote to impose the death
penalty regardless of the facts. Because the trial judge asked questions
concerning the jurors fairness and impartiality during voir dire, the court
found thatthe voir dire was ofthe same
general nature as the "reverseWitherspoon" inquiry. Morgan, 112 S.
Ct. at 2226.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
and held that the "reverse- Witherspoon"
inquiry was not constitutionally required. It also found the Morgan jury
fair and impartial because each juror
had sworn to uphold the law and none
expressed partial views. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether, during voir dire
for a capital offense, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a trial court to refuse to ask
whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty
upon conviction.
The Court first confirmed the impartiality requirement imposed upon a
jury during the sentencing phase of a
capital offense case. [d. at 2228. The
Court invoked its decision in Turnerv.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), in
which the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause required impartiality to the same
extent required underthe Sixth Amendment of any jury empaneled to decide
a case. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
Next, the Court determined, in accordance with the holding in Wainwright v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985),
that when a juror's views on capital
punishment would impair the performance of her duty to follow instructions, such a juror is not impartial and
must be removed for cause. Morgan.
112 S. Ct. at 2229. In support of its
conclusion, the Court cited its decision
in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81
(1988), in which a juror who would
have automatically voted for the death
penalty was removed by preemptory
challenge. The Court determined that
the failure to remove the juror forcause
was error under the standard set forth
in Witt. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
The Court next addressed whether
a trial court must inquire into a juror's
views on capital punishment upon a
defendant's request. Voir dire, the
Court stated, is a critical method of
effectuating the criminal defendant's
right to an impartial jury. [d. at 2230.
Only with the proper voir dire can a
trial judge fulfill the responsibility of
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identifying and removing jurors who
would "not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence." Id. (quoting RosalesLopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,
188 (1981». The Court, therefore,
reiterated that because there was a right
to challenge a juror based on bias, then
there remained the right to propose
questions designed to uncover bias.
The trial judge would thereafter be
responsible for determining ifthe challenge was proper. Morgan, 112 S. Ct.
at 2232.
.
Finally, the Court addressed the
remaining issue of whether questions
propounded by the trial court were
sufficient to satisfy the petitioner's right
to due process. Id. The Court determined that jurors who would ''unalterably" either oppose or propose the
death penalty in every case were incapable of following the law in the performance of their duties. Id. at 2233.
The Court, therefore, concluded that a
trial court's general questions concerning fairness and impartiality would be
insufficient to identify jurors with biased views about the death penalty. It
would be possible, the Court added, for
jurors to intend to uphold the law, but
be unaware that dogmatic beliefs about
the death penalty would prevent them
from doing so. Id. The petitioner was
thus entitled to ask specific questions
which would identify jurors with predetermined opinions about whether or
not to impose the death penalty regardless ofthe facts ofthe case. Id. at 2233.
The Supreme Court in Morgan v.
Illinois established that the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment enables a capital defendant to
challenge and remove for cause jurors
whose views on capital punishment
would lead them to automatically vote
for the death penalty upon conviction.
The decision is a significant victory for
capital defendants and their attorneys
because it aids their ability to ferret out
jurors who hold unreasonable convictions concerning capital punishment.
Because most people perceive themselves as fair, general questions con-

ceming an individual's ability to judge
fairly are insufficient inquiry for the
purposes of identifying partiality
among jurors. Furthermore, the inclusion of capital defendants among those
possessed with the ability to impose a
Witherspoon inquiry balances the scales
between the State's and the defendant's
ability to successfully challenge jurors
and remove them for cause.
- Kim Germaine Judd
New York v. United Stllles: TAKE

TITLE PROVISION OF LOWLEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
POLICY AMENDMENT ACT
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In New York v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the Supreme Court
ofthe United States held that the ''take
title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment
Actofl985 violatedtheTenthAmendment of the United States Constitution. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court resolved a constitutional issue of
the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the
States. The Court decided that although Congress may encourage a state
to provide for the disposal oflow level
radioactive waste generated within its
borders, it may not compel a state to do
so.
At the end ofthe 1970's, Congress
faced an environmental crisis in the
disposal oflow level radioactive waste.
This type of waste, generated from
sources as disparate as smoke alarms
and medical fluids, must be isolated
from humans for up to hundreds of
years. Despite a crucial need for repositories ofsuch waste, the number of
disposal sites had dwindled. By 1979,
the only operating disposal site in the
country was in South Carolina. Therefore, that state alone bore the burden of
storing low level radioactive waste produced throughout the nation. To avert
disaster, Congress responded by enacting the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980 ("1980
Act"). The 1980 Act held each State
responsible for the disposal of waste

that it generated. A State could dispose

of its waste at a disposal facility located either within its borders or in
another State with which it had reached
a regional compact agreement. B~
cause the 1980 Act carried no penalty
for non-compliance, by 1985 thirtyone states had not joined a regional
compact and were due to be excluded,
leaving them no assured outlet for their
low level radioactive waste.
Faced with this prospect, Congress
passed the Low-Level Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 ("1985
Act"). Three incentives were created
to encourage states to provide for disposal of waste generated within their
borders. First, monetary incentives in
the form of payments from a designated escrow account would be made
to States that complied with the statute's
deadlines. Second, the deadlines were
linked to access to the sites; thus, States
that did not comply would be assessed
progressively higher surcharges and
eventually denied access completely.
The third provision required that each
State which failed to comply with the
established deadline take title to the
waste generated within its borders and
be held liable for all damages incurred
as a consequence of the State's failure
to take possession.
The State of New York chose to
conform to the Act's requirements by
passing legislation to provide for the
siting and financing ofa disposal facility in its state. The State ofNew York
and residents of two of the counties in
which sites had been proposed filed
suit against the United States in the
United States District Court for the
NorthemDistrictofNewYorkseeking
a declaratory judgment that the 1985
Act was unconstitutional. They acknowledged that Congress could regulate interstate commerce in waste material under the Commerce Clause and
that Congress could use the Supremacy
Clause to pre-empt state regulation of
radioactive waste. They claimed, however, that by directing the states to
regulate in this field, Congress violated the Tenth Amendment. Nevada,
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